

Offre n°2024-08418

Master Internships on Deep Learning Side-Channel Security

Le descriptif de l'offre ci-dessous est en Anglais

Type de contrat :Stage

Niveau de diplôme exigé :Bac + 4 ou équivalent

Autre diplôme apprécié :M1/M2 students (4th or 5th year Eng.) in Computer/Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, Embedded Systems, Electronics/Microelectronics

Fonction :Stagiaire de la recherche

Niveau d'expérience souhaité :Jeune diplômé

A propos du centre ou de la direction fonctionnelle

The Inria center at the University of Rennes is one of eight Inria centers and has more than thirty research teams. The Inria center is a major and recognized player in the field of digital sciences. It is at the heart of a rich ecosystem of R&D and innovation, including highly innovative SMEs, large industrial groups, competitiveness clusters, research and higher education institutions, centers of excellence, and technological research institutes.

Contexte et atouts du poste

The internships are expected to start around February/March and extend for up to 6 months

Scientific context

After more than 20 years of research, Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks are still one of the most critical vulnerabilities in embedded systems. By looking for correlations between processed data and physical, observable side effects of computing like power consumption, Electromagnetic (EM) emanations, or timing, SCA attacks have been traditionally directed to retrieve cryptographic keys from ciphers like AES. However, the increasing adoption of Machine and Deep Learning (ML, DL) is making Artificial Intelligence (AI) a new target. As these systems increasingly deal with sensitive data and control critical infrastructures, new vulnerabilities are reported, and the **hardware/software security of ML/DL systems** is emerging as a key cybersecurity concern for building trustworthy AI-based systems [1, 2]. **SCA attacks to DNN implementations** enable the recovery of secret assets like models' structure, parameters, and private data inputs, which jeopardizes privacy and enables counterfeiting by reverse-engineering of models [3, 4] and the structure and dataflow scheduling of encrypted IP hardware accelerators [5]. Such side-channel-assisted information can also help adversaries fool systems more easily toward misclassifications. We are interested in both local SCA attacks to edge devices, highly exposed to attackers [6–9], and remote SCA attacks to cloud FPGAs [10, 11].

The traditional target of SCA has been a cryptographic key, so certain assumptions about the system runtime properties have usually been given for granted. One such assumption is that the system operates free of errors. However, to save energy, a new computing paradigm called **Approximate Computing (AxC)** aims at exploiting the tolerance to errors of certain applications by trading-off quality of results (e.g., precision or accuracy) with reduced usage of computational resources (energy, hardware, time), to allow building faster and less power-hungry computing systems. AxC techniques can be applied at different levels, from circuits all the way up to applications [12, 13]. Examples include (1) undervolting (reducing the power supply level even beyond the recommended margins of manufacturers), (2) approximate circuits, storage, and memory, and (3) software-level approximations like skipping computations through loop perforation.

References

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- [3] M. Méndez Real and R. Salvador. "Physical Side-Channel Attacks on Embedded Neural Networks: A Survey". *Appl. Sci.* 11 15, 2021, p. 6790. doi: 10.3390/app11156790.
- [4] P. Horváth, D. Lauret, Z. Liu, and L. Batina. "SoK: Neural Network Extraction Through Physical Side Channels". *33rd USENIX Security Symp.* 2024, pp. 3403–3422.
- [5] C. Gongye, Y. Luo, X. Xu, and Y. Fei. "Side-Channel-Assisted Reverse-Engineering of Encrypted DNN Hardware Accelerator IP and Attack Surface Exploration". *IEEE S&P. IEEE Computer Society*, Oct. 2023, pp.

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- [6] M. Isakov, V. Gadepally, K. M. Gettings, and M. A. Kinsky. "Survey of Attacks and Defenses on Edge-Deployed Neural Networks". IEEE HPEC. 2019, pp. 1–8. doi: 10.1109/HPEC.2019.8916519.
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 - [10] Y. Zhang, R. Yasaei, H. Chen, Z. Li, and M. A. A. Faruque. "Stealing Neural Network Structure Through Remote FPGA Side-Channel Analysis". IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 16 2021, pp. 4377–4388. doi: 10.1109/TIFS.2021.3106169.
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 - [12] S. Mittal. "A Survey of Techniques for Approximate Computing". ACM Computing Surveys 48.4 Mar. 2016, 62:1–62:33. doi: 10.1145/2893356.
 - [13] G. Armeniakos, G. Zervakis, D. Soudris, and J. Henkel. "Hardware Approximate Techniques for Deep Neural Network Accelerators: A Survey". ACM Comput. Surv. Mar. 2022. doi: 10.1145/3527156.

Mission confiée

The objectives of these internships are to investigate the side-channel vulnerabilities of DL systems and to design secure implementations against SCA attacks. The focus is either on SW implementations in microcontrollers or HW accelerators in heterogeneous reconfigurable platforms (MPSoC-PGAs).

An initial step is replicating existing attacks from the literature, either to retrieve the model/architecture (hyperparameters), the parameters (weights, activation function), or the inputs. Although the focus is on physical side-channel vulnerabilities exploiting power consumption or EM emanations, the objectives can be adapted to explore other leakage sources, such as microarchitectural side-channels. As the internships advance, different directions are possible, and hence, specific activities will be discussed with the students according to their interests.

Principales activités

Depending on the direction taken in each internship, different lines of work are possible:

- **DNN implementations using AxC techniques.** Extend our current workflow and setup to implement DNN models in microcontrollers or FPGAs using AxC techniques and exploring frameworks like TinyML
- **Evaluation of DNN side-channel security.** Study the literature on standard side-channel evaluation methodologies and metrics (TVLA, SNR, etc...), and assess their adequacy in the context of DNN side-channel vulnerabilities
- **Impact of DNN configurations and AxC techniques.** Study how different configurations, parameters and DNN implementations can affect the observable side channels. These can include:
 - Exact vs. AxC implementations at the software or hardware level
 - Compiler optimizations
 - Microarchitectural features (cache configuration, multiple instruction issue, etc.)
- **Implementation and evaluation of countermeasures.** Study the existing countermeasures from the literature, implement and evaluate one of them, and/or study new approaches.

Compétences

You should have a strong background in at least one of the following topics:

- Side-channel attacks, side-channel analysis, and evaluation methodologies, cryptanalysis
- Other HW/SW security background
- Design for FPGAs and hands-on experience in prototyping and implementations
- HW or SW implementations of DNNs (FPGAs, microcontrollers, other accelerators/systems)
- ML/AI frameworks (TinyML, PyTorch, TensorFlow, TFLite...)

Other interesting technical skills include:

- Programming in C/C++/Python
- Use of Linux/Git as a development environment
- Good use of laboratory instruments (oscilloscopes, power supplies, etc.)

Languages: You can speak, write, and read English at a professional level (french language is not required).

Avantages

- Subsidized meals
- Social, cultural and sports events and activities

Informations générales

- **Thème/Domaine :** Sécurité et confidentialité
Systèmes d'information (BAP E)
- **Ville :** Rennes
- **Centre Inria :** [Centre Inria de l'Université de Rennes](#)
- **Date de prise de fonction souhaitée :** 2025-02-01
- **Durée de contrat :** 6 mois
- **Date limite pour postuler :** 2025-01-02

Contacts

- **Équipe Inria :** [SUSHI](#)
- **Recruteur :**
Salvador Perea Ruben / ruben.salvador@inria.fr

A propos d'Inria

Inria est l'institut national de recherche dédié aux sciences et technologies du numérique. Il emploie 2600 personnes. Ses 215 équipes-projets agiles, en général communes avec des partenaires académiques, impliquent plus de 3900 scientifiques pour relever les défis du numérique, souvent à l'interface d'autres disciplines. L'institut fait appel à de nombreux talents dans plus d'une quarantaine de métiers différents. 900 personnels d'appui à la recherche et à l'innovation contribuent à faire émerger et grandir des projets scientifiques ou entrepreneuriaux qui impactent le monde. Inria travaille avec de nombreuses entreprises et a accompagné la création de plus de 200 start-up. L'institut s'efforce ainsi de répondre aux enjeux de la transformation numérique de la science, de la société et de l'économie.

Attention: Les candidatures doivent être déposées en ligne sur le site Inria. Le traitement des candidatures adressées par d'autres canaux n'est pas garanti.

Consignes pour postuler

Sécurité défense :

Ce poste est susceptible d'être affecté dans une zone à régime restrictif (ZRR), telle que définie dans le décret n°2011-1425 relatif à la protection du potentiel scientifique et technique de la nation (PPST). L'autorisation d'accès à une zone est délivrée par le chef d'établissement, après avis ministériel favorable, tel que défini dans l'arrêté du 03 juillet 2012, relatif à la PPST. Un avis ministériel défavorable pour un poste affecté dans une ZRR aurait pour conséquence l'annulation du recrutement.

Politique de recrutement :

Dans le cadre de sa politique diversité, tous les postes Inria sont accessibles aux personnes en situation de handicap.